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Abstract 
 Using a sample of 279 buyout backed firms, I examined the effect of lockup agreements 
on the firm’s stock returns. I found there to be a negative .8 percent cumulative abnormal return 
for the three-day period surrounding lockup expiration. Consistent with my hypothesis the CAR 
for the three-day period surrounding lockup expiration was less negative for buyout backed IPOs 
compared to venture capital backed IPOs. In addition, I found there to be an abnormal 24.24 
percent increase in trading volume for the three days surrounding lockup expiration. 
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I. Introduction 
A company’s initial public offering (IPO) represents the first opportunity for investors to 
reap the benefits of their investment. Investors such as private equity firms typically inject these 
companies with large amounts of debt and take these companies public to liquefy their time 
limited funds. Although investors hold a large amount of shares at the IPO, ultimately, these 
firms are unable to liquidate their entire investment at this time. This is typically due to use of 
lockup agreements, a tool used by underwriters to prevent inside shareholders from completely 
liquefying their stake in the firm before a certain date, typically 180 days post-IPO.1 As much as 
two-thirds of a company’s total shares are prevented from being sold before the lockup 
expiration.2 When the lockup agreement expires, insiders usually flood the market with sell 
orders in order to liquidate the majority of their stake in the firm.3  
Economists have conducted studies on the effect of lockup agreements, (Field and Hanka 
(2000), Brav and Gompers (2003), Bradley and Jordan (2000)), however, only a small amount of 
literature exists about the effects of lockup agreements on buyout backed IPOs. Instead, the vast 
majority of literature examines the effects of lockup agreements on either the entire IPO market 
or venture capital backed IPOs. 
This paper aims to address this gap within the literature by assessing the effects of lockup 
agreements on buyout backed IPOs. Unlike prior literature that examines the effect of lockup 
                                                             
1 Field, Laura C., and Gordon Hanka. "The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups." Journal of Finance 56.2 (April 
2001): 471. Print. 
2 Ibid 
3 SEC Rule 144 limits the sale of restricted securities by insiders. Rule 144 prevents insiders from selling restricted 
securities in quantities of greater than 1 percent of the shares outstanding for any three month period after lockup 
expiration. However, it should be noted that this rule only applies to affiliates of the issuer; otherwise, one can sell 
restricted securities with no limitation. (http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/rule144.htm)  
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agreements on venture capital IPOs or the entire IPO market, my study differs because I examine 
the effect of lockup agreement on a sample entirely composed of buyout backed IPOs. 
Additionally, while previous literature contained IPOs from the time range of 1980 to 2000, I 
will examine IPOs within the time span of 1990 to 2010.  
To understand the importance of examining lockup agreements effect on buyout backed 
IPOs, it is important to discuss the differences between buyout and venture capital backed IPOs. 
Unlike venture capital firms which typically invest minority stakes in early-stage companies with 
proprietary technology, buyout firms invest majority stakes in mature companies that are already 
established competitive market participants.4  Buyout firms differing investment strategy leads 
me to hypothesize that the stock return surrounding lockup expiration will be less negative for 
buyout backed IPOs compared to venture capital backed IPOs.  
This paper will consist of the following sections. Section II describes my hypothesis, 
Section III provides background on lockup agreements and buyout backed IPOs. Section IV 
explains the sample construction process, Section V describes the sample the characteristics of 
the finalized sample, and Section VI displays my testing methodologies and results. Finally, 
Section VII concludes the paper and Section VIII is the appendix. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 Katz, Sharon. "Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors." NBER Working 
Paper NBER Working Paper No. 14085 (June 2008): 7. Print. 
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II. Hypothesis 
  
 My study of the stock return of buyout backed holds similar characteristics to Field and 
Hanka’s (2001) study of the effect of lockup agreements on the entire IPO market. They tested 
the three day cumulative abnormal return (CAR)5 surrounding the lockup date as well as the 
abnormal volume. For the three days surrounding lockup, they found a -1.5 percent return and 
permanent 40 percent in trading volume.6 I will test for the surrounding three day abnormal 
return and abnormal volume surrounding the same time period as well. 
 Unlike Field and Hanka (2001) who test the effect of lockup agreements on the entire 
IPO market, I will exclusively test the effects of lockup agreements surrounding buyout backed 
IPOs. Field and Hanka’s study only differentiates between venture capital backed and non-
venture capital IPOs and does not study buyout backed IPOs. Unlike venture capital backed (a 
large portion of Field and Hanka’s sample) which typically receive funding at early stages of a 
firm’s existence, buyout firms typically invest in more mature companies in the later stages of 
the firm’s life.7 For example, although Field and Hanka find a CAR of negative 1.5 percent and a 
negative 2.3 percent return for venture capital firms, they found only a negative 0.8 percent 
return for non-venture capital backed firms.8 
                                                             
5 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) represent s the difference between the expected and actual stock return 
("Abnormal Return." Abnormal Return. Investopedia. Web. Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/abnormalreturn.asp>.) 
6 Field, Laura C., and Gordon Hanka. "The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups." Journal of Finance 56.2 (April 
2001): 471. Print. 
7 Katz, Sharon. "Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors." NBER Working 
Paper NBER Working Paper No. 14085 (June 2008): 7. Print. 
8 Field, Laura C., and Gordon Hanka. "The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups." Journal of Finance 56.2 (April 
2001): 471. Print 
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Examining Figure 1, historical evidence shows that venture capital backed IPOs have 
historically been more volatile than buyout backed IPOs. 9 10 I argue this volatility stems from the 
fact that a large portion of venture capital sponsored IPOs involve proprietary technology that 
makes these firm’s cash flows and net asset value more volatile. I further argue this volatility 
will have an effect on the stock returns of venture capital backed firms, and therefore, their stock 
returns surrounding lockup expiration. I hypothesize that since buyout backed IPOs are typically 
more mature firms with greater stability (i.e. more steady cash flows, strong financials), it will 
lead to less volatile stock returns (and therefore less volatile stock returns surrounding lockup 
expiration). Additionally, because buyout backed IPOs are more mature, they have already had 
the full effects of financial disclosure before IPO (this will result in less information 
asymmetries).11 Consequently, this mitigates the risk of insiders taking advantage of 
asymmetrical information, and the market perceives these firms as less risky than their venture 
capital counterpart.12 I hypothesize that these differentiating characteristics makes buyout backed 
IPOs stock returns less volatile. As a result, this will make the buyout backed firms stock returns 
surrounding lockup expiration less negative than previous literature has shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 Annual volatility measures the annual volatility of the adjusted cash flows and total net asset value (%) of the 
sample. It is calculated as the standard deviation of the percentage change year to year  
10 Thomson ONE Banker. Thomson ONE. Claremont Colleges Library, Claremont, CA. April 2010                           
< http://banker.thomsonib.com/ta/?ExpressCode=claremontuniv>. 
11 Katz, Sharon. "Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors." NBER Working 
Paper NBER Working Paper No. 14085 (June 2008): 7. Print. 
12 Ibid 
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III. Background 
Over the last decade, economists have published a plethora of literature on lockup 
agreements. Lockup agreement literature is broken into two main categories, the motives behind 
lockup agreement usage (Brav and Gompers (2003), Yung and Zender (2009)) and the effect of 
lockup agreements affect on firm’s share price (Field and Hanka (2001), Brau et. Al. (2007). In 
addition, I examined literature discussing the characteristics of buyout backed firms (Levis 
(2010), Katz (2009)).   
Lockup agreements serve a variety of purposes. Underwriters use lockup agreements in a 
majority of IPOs, even though they are not required by the SEC.13 The use of lockup agreements 
is widespread because they serve a variety of purposes that help support the share price of the 
stock as well as instill market confidence. These agreements reassure the market that:  key 
                                                             
13 Brav, Alan, and Paul A. Gompers. "The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings." The Review of Financial 
Studies 16.1 (Spring 2003): 3. Print. 
Figure 1 
6 
 
company employees will perform their job at the best of their abilities until the lockup period 
expires, it signals the market that insiders will not liquidating their shares due to bad news at 
IPO.14 Finally, lockup agreements serve as a means for underwriters to temporarily sustain a high 
stock price by temporarily restricting the supply of shares.15  
Lockup agreements mitigate the threat of insiders capitalizing on asymmetric 
information. Insiders hold high levels of asymmetric information, which could be exploited for 
personal gain. Leading into the 21st century, the market encountered a wave of IPOs stemming 
largely from the technology sector. These companies have a competitive advantage stemming 
from their knowledge of proprietary technology that could be the next major product in the ever-
evolving technology sector. For example, if insiders held inside information that could damage 
the firm’s reputation, they would be inclined to sell their shares immediately at IPO to hedge 
their losses. Thus, it is evident that lockup agreements are powerful tools that mitigate the risks 
posed to firms at IPO. By limiting these risk factors, a firm appears more appealing for potential 
investors. 
Economists have studied the rationale behind companies implementing these restricting 
agreements. Brav and Gompers (2003) studied the role of lockups in IPOs by testing three 
possible explanations for lockups: (i) signaling of the quality of the firm, (ii) a commitment 
device to fix the moral hazard problem, or (iii) a method for underwriters to increase their 
compensation, their results support the commitment hypothesis.16 17 They argue prior to lockup 
                                                             
14 Katz, Sharon. "Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors." NBER Working 
Paper NBER Working Paper No. 14085 (June 2008): 7. Print. 
15 Ibid 
16 Brav, Alan, and Paul A. Gompers. "The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings." The Review of Financial 
Studies 16.1 (Spring 2003): 1. Print. 
17 Unlike the signaling hypothesis which predicts firm’s lockup their shares to show the market that insiders have 
confidence in the firm, the commitment hypothesis says that a firm’s insiders (who have high moral hazard 
7 
 
expiration, firm related news is massively produced (i.e. analyst reports, SEC filings, etc.).18 
Consequently, individuals are more willing to invest in the firm knowing that insiders’ ability to 
capitalize on insider information is reduced. Brav and Gompers (2003) also find that while 
holding the quality of the firm constant, firms where insiders have higher moral hazard 
incentives tend to have longer lockup periods to convince the market to invest in the firm. 
Extended lockup periods are prominent amount younger firms, firms with proprietary 
technology, or firms with other information not disclosed to the public. Brav and Gompers find 
that lockups act as a commitment hypothesis to alleviate the moral hazard problem and are not 
used as a signaling method or a means for the underwriter to extract additional fees.19 
Prior literature ((Brav and Gompers (2003), Brau et al. (2005)) has typically treated the 
theorized motives lockup agreements as mutually exclusive. Yung and Zender (2009) conversely 
hypothesize that the motives are interrelated motives.20 Yung and Zender (2009) argue that all 
firms experience both moral hazard and asymmetric information risk at IPO, however, one risk 
will be more dominant and will be the principal reason behind implementing a lockup 
agreement.21  They found a positive correlation between lockup length and IPO underpricing for 
firms where asymmetric information plays a more dominant role than the issue of moral hazard. 
Conversely, Yung and Zender (2009) find that there is no correlation between lockup length and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
incentives in the aftermarket) would be forced to accept a longer lockup in order to convince the market to buy at 
IPO. 
18 Brav, Alan, and Paul A. Gompers. "The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings." The Review of Financial 
Studies 16.1 (Spring 2003): 1. Print. 
19 Brav, Alan, and Paul A. Gompers. "The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings." The Review of Financial 
Studies 16.1 (Spring 2003): 5. Print. 
20 Yung, Chris, and Jaime F. Zender. "Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information and IPO Lockups." Journal of 
Corporate Finance 16 (2009): 320. Print. 
21 To understand Young and Zender (2009) hypothesis, it is helpful to understand how moral hazard and asymmetric 
information complement each other. Moral hazard is the risk that firm insiders will take advantage of asymmetric 
information (insiders knowledge of firm’s overall health, techonology, etc.), which results in negative consequences 
for shareholders. As asymmetric information held by insiders increases, so will the risk of moral hazard. These two 
factors will determine lockup length based on the cumulative risk of both.  
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IPO underpricing.22 This conjecture stems from their evidence that underpricing drives 
asymmetric information and not from the moral hazard issue. Yung and Zender (2009) conclude 
that firms where asymmetric information is the dominant reason for lockup suffer from both 
underpricing and lockup length. If moral hazard is the dominant motive for lockup, only 
underpricing will be affected. Yung and Zender (2009) also find that firms using a reputable 
underwrite suffer from less asymmetric information and therefore will have more moral hazard 
risk, whereas firms who hire a less reputable underwriter will suffer the opposite.23 
In addition to studying the motives behind lockup agreements, other economists focus on 
lockup agreements affect on firm’s stock returns. Economists have consistently found abnormal 
return for the three days surrounding a IPOs lockup agreement. For example, Field and Hanka 
(2001) studied the effects of lockup agreements on IPO market. Using a sample of 1,948 IPOs, 
Field and Hanka showed that lockup expiration, on average, led to a three-day abnormal stock 
return of negative 1.5 percent, as well as a permanent 40 percent increase in average trading 
volume. Although Field and Hanka (2001) sample included all types of IPOs, their regression 
used a dummy variable for venture capital IPOs. Their evidence shows a more negative return as 
well as higher trading volume for firms that are venture capital sponsored.24  
Economists such as Brau et.al (2007) explore whether secondary shares (i.e. post-lockup 
share issuance) have a negative effect on aftermarket performance. Brau tests whether secondary 
share sales represent a negative signal through aftermarket performance. They find that 
                                                             
22 Yung, Chris, and Jaime F. Zender. "Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information and IPO Lockups." Journal of 
Corporate Finance 16 (2009): 331. Print. 
23 Yung, Chris, and Jaime F. Zender. "Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information and IPO Lockups." Journal of 
Corporate Finance 16 (2009): 331. Print. 
24 Field, Laura C., and Gordon Hanka. "The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups." Journal of Finance 56.2 (April 
2001): 471. Print. 
9 
 
secondary share sales are in general not correlated with poorer initial or long-run performance.25  
However, selling by officers and directors is associated with poorer long-run returns. Four major 
points summarize their conclusion. First, the aftermarket performance is not affected by the 
offering type (primary or secondary). This shows that secondary share sales are due to 
shareholder portfolio diversification, not market sentiment that the firm’s stock is overpriced. 
Second, secondary offerings, such as the expiration of the lockup period, do not lead to poorer 
market performance. Third, market conditions directly affect secondary share revisions. Fourth, 
IPO secondary shares sales and IPO secondary share revisions do not convey negative 
information that is captured in aftermarket price performance.26 
There is very limited literature on the effect of lockup agreements on buyout backed 
IPOs.  Levis (2010), examined buyout backed offerings27 and the returns relative to venture 
capital groups post lockup agreements for firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. Using a 
sample period spanning from January 1992 to September 2005, he found that relative to venture 
capital backed and non-backed IPOs, private-equity backed IPOs are more profitable, larger, and 
less underpriced.28  
Katz (2008) investigated the effect of ownership structure buyout backed firms. Although 
Katz’s paper provides no insight on buyout backed IPO lockup agreements, he did provide vital 
information on the difference between private-equity driven IPOs compared to those backed by 
venture capital firms. Katz explains, “unlike [venture capital firms], which invest in early-stage 
                                                             
25 Brau, James C., Mingsheng Li, and Jing Shi. "Do Secondary Shares in the IPO Process Have a Negative Effect on 
Aftermarket Performance?" Journal of Banking & Finance 31 (2007): 2612-2631. Print. 
26 Brau, James C., Mingsheng Li, and Jing Shi. "Do Secondary Shares in the IPO Process Have a Negative Effect on 
Aftermarket Performance?" Journal of Banking & Finance 31 (2007): 2629. Print. 
27 Some literature such as Levis (2010) and Katz (2008) use private equity IPO to describe buyout backed IPOs. 
Consistent with my definition of buyout backed IPO, Levis and Katz define private equity backed IPOs as a firm 
who buys a majority stake in the acquiring firm, which is typically a mature established company. (Levis pg 7) (Katz  
pg 7) 
28 Levis, Mario, “The Performance Private Equity Backed IPOs.” (2010): 1-37. Print. 
10 
 
and mostly not yet profitable companies, [buyout firms] generally buy mature, profitable 
businesses that had been subject to full financial disclosure before the IPO.”29 This consequently 
lessens the risk of asymmetric information from existing, which will lead to less underpricing at 
the IPO. In addition, Katz explains that buyout backed sponsors typically seek to acquire a 
majority stake using high levels of debt whereas venture capital sponsors generally invest only a 
minority stake in young firms that are developing or applying new technology.30 
Thus, the majority of the lockup agreement literature produced has used the entire IPO 
market or venture capital firms as the data sample. The lack of literature regarding the effect of 
lockup agreements on private-equity driven IPOs has provided me with the opportunity to fill an 
existing gap in the literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
29 Katz, Sharon. "Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors." NBER Working 
Paper NBER Working Paper No. 14085 (June 2008): 7. Print. 
30 Ibid 
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IV. Sample Construction 
Using Thomson ONE Banker, I was able to acquire my initial sample of buyout backed 
IPOs. The sample was compiled using a variety of search criteria. This included a time span 
ranging from January 1, 1990 to January 1, 2011. The first search criteria in the sample 
construction was the exclusion of all venture capital backed IPOs. This resulted in a base sample 
of private equity firms, private equity advisors, and private equity fund of funds.31 Next, I 
excluded all startup stage, early stage, expansion, or late stage because these selections typically 
include younger firms (characteristics of venture-capital sponsored IPOs). 
To better refine my sample to consist solely of buyout backed IPOs (mature and 
established firms in their respective industry); I solely included buyout/acquisition firms.32 The 
buyout/acquisition selection included leveraged buyouts, recap/turnaround, management buyout 
(MBO), and management buy-in (MBI), secondary buyout, pending acquisition, and other 
acquisition. By limiting the sample to buyout/acquisition firms, it will require the buyout firm to 
have a majority stake in the firm. As a result, firm’s with a minority stake in the firm (such as 
venture capital firms), will be excluded from the sample. 
                                                             
31 Thomson ONE Banker defines private equity sponsors as firms that invest solely in private equity investments and 
provide equity financing to companies engaged in a variety of industries. In addition, they focus on management 
buyouts, industry consolidations, re-capitalization of existing business and other private equity opportunities. 
Conversely, venture capital sponsors specialize in providing money to startup firms and small businesses with high 
growth potential. (Thomson ONE Banker). An example of a private equity/buyout backed IPO is Caribou Coffee. In 
1998 Arcapita, a private equity firm specializing in buyouts of American companies obtained a controlling interest 
in the firm. (http://www.arcapita.com/private_equity/strategy.html). Caribou Coffee was founded in 1992 and taken 
public in 2005 (http://moneycentral.hoovers.com/global/msn/factsheet.xhtml?COID=106161). A venture capital 
sponsored IPO would be characterized as an IPO where the sponsor if providing the initial funding to get the firm 
started. Therefore, buyout firms invest in mature firms already established within the market whereas venture capital 
are typically invested in the firm at is earliest of stages. 
32 Thomson ONE Banker defines buyout/acquisition as a firm who makes a leveraged buyout, management buyout 
or acquisition investments. These funds use debt in addition to equity to leverage the size of their investments and 
increase the potential return on investment.  
12 
 
The third and final IPO search criteria selected was the fund investment focus selection; I 
excluded all venture capital and real estate IPOs. More specifically this excluded seed stage, 
early stage, balanced stage, later stage IPOs as well as core, opportunistic, and value real estate 
IPOs. This better refined my search to only include buyout backed IPOs.  
The initial sample from Thomson ONE Banker comprised of 855 buyout backed IPOs. 
The sample included information on the IPO price, IPO shares, IPO initial value, and the post 
offer value. However, the sample did not provide me with information related to the lockup date, 
time span of lockup, and percentage of shares subject to lockup, etc.33 To obtain the information 
on the actual lockup date, I searched in the Thomson ONE Banker Equity database for the 
lockup information. These search variables included each IPOs macro description, main SIC 
code, public status date, IPO flag (Y/N), lockup flag (Y/N), lockup expiration date, percent of 
shares outstanding subject to lockup agreement, lockup days, and lockup shares. 
 Unfortunately, Thomson ONE Banker did not provide lockup information for all 855 
firms. As a result, firms with missing data were excluded from the sample set. This significantly 
decreased the sample from 855 to 543 firms. Typical reasons for sample exclusion included: that 
the IPO was not buyout backed, the IPO did not have a lockup agreement, or an overall lack of 
lockup agreement data. 
 Several firms in the sample contained information related to the lockup, however, lacked 
other information, such as stock ticker. I used EdgarOnline to fill these holes in the data sample. 
If missing information could not be found using Thomson ONE Banker or Edgar Online, those 
IPOs were excluded from the sample. The main reason surrounding exclusion from the sample 
                                                             
33 This information is necessary to calculate the stock price around the lockup date and calculate the cumulative 
abnormal return.  
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stemmed primarily from IPOs where a stock ticker was not given in the initial search. These 
firms were typically unlisted from an exchange.  
Another problem encountered was the lack of information provided by Thomson ONE 
Banker regarding the shares subject to lockup. For missing samples, I searched for each firm’s 
individual S-1 SEC filing form (SEC form to register securities) to find the amount of shares 
locked up. If no data could be found, those samples were excluded as well. The finalized sample 
is organized in excel format with each firms IPO and lockup information inputted on a single 
row. 
  With this initial set of IPOs, daily stock price data was collected using the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) 
database. The search criteria provided daily stock price information for 50 days before and 50 
days after the lockup agreement date. Other firm information gained included the daily Standard 
& Poor 500 return, daily trading volume, each firm’s respective exchange, and the shares 
outstanding. The percentage of shares locked proved to be the largest gap in the data sample and 
resulted in the exclusion of a 71 firms from the sample. For several firms no trading data could 
be found; those firms were excluded from the final sample. The final data set includes 279 
buyout backed IPOs.  
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V. Sample Characteristics 
 Stock return data was collected using the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Table 1 describes the sample’s index 
distribution. The sample includes 152 (54%) NASDAQ stocks, 124 (44%) NYSE stocks, and 3 
(1%) AMEX stocks. Table 2 describes that 45 (16.1%) of the companies lockups occurred 
between 1990 and 1999 and 234 stocks (83.9%) were from 2000-2010.  
Table 6 details on the percentage of shares subject to lockup, which is defined as the 
amount of shares locked up at IPO. The sample had an average of 58.4 percent of the shares 
locked up with a median of 62.83 percent. Also, the 25th percentile is 47.40 percent, and the 99th 
percentile is 90.56 percent. This differs from Field and Hanka (2001) sample where the sample 
average of shares amounted to 63 percent. Other studies such as Bradley et. al (2001) find an 
average of 60.47 percent of shares locked up for venture capital firms. Therefore, buyout backed 
IPOs tend to lockup fewer shares compared to venture capital backed IPOs/the entire IPO 
market.  
 The standard length of 180 days dominates the sample’s lockup length, 93 percent of the 
sample has a lockup equal to 180 days. Lockups greater than 180 days and lockups less than 180 
days each represent approximately 3.5 percent of the sample.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
Index N % 
NASDAQ 152 54% 
NYSE 124 44% 
AMEX 3 1% 
Total 279   
Table 1 
 
Time Period N % 
1990-1999 45 16.1% 
2000-2010 234 83.9% 
Total 279   
Table 2 
 
Percentage of Shares  
Subject to Lockup (N=279) 
Percentile Amount (%) 
25% 47.40% 
50% 62.83% 
75% 74.58% 
99% 90.56% 
Table 3 
 
 Table 4 shows the sample distribution among business sector. Data on the business sector 
was collected using Thomson ONE Banker.   Thomson ONE Banker separates the business 
sector by TF macrocodes, which is their methodology for sorting based on SIC codes, NAIC 
codes, and overall business description. This results in 14 different industry sector classes. 
Although Thomson ONE Banker uses 14 different macro level classifications, the final sample is 
broken down into 12 different macro industry classifications: consumer products & services 
(15.41%), consumer staples (3.58%), energy & power (9.32%), financials (10.39%), healthcare 
(7.53%), high-technology (15.05%), industrials (11.47%), materials (7.53%), media & 
16 
 
entertainment (5.02%), real estate (1.08%), retail (9.32%), and telecommunications (4.30%). 
Table 4 explains the sector breakdown of the final sample.  
 
Sector N % 
Consumer Products & Services 43.00 15.41% 
Consumer Staples 10.00 3.58% 
Energy & Power 26.00 9.32% 
Financials 29.00 10.39% 
Healthcare 21.00 7.53% 
High-Technology 42.00 15.05% 
Industrials 32.00 11.47% 
Materials 21.00 7.53% 
Media & Entertainment 14.00 5.02% 
Real estate 3.00 1.08% 
Retail  26.00 9.32% 
Telecommunications 12.00 4.30% 
Total 279.00   
Table 4 
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VI. Methodology and Results 
 
Calculation of Cumulative Abnormal Return  
 I used the daily returns of each stock to calculate the return surrounding the lockup date. 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) was calculated using the formula: 
 
 
where  
 Ri,t = Return of firm i (i=1,…, 279) at time t (t=1,…, 89)  
 Rm,t = S&P 500’s return at time t 
 β1 = S&P Return Coefficient  
 γ1 = Dummy Variable Coefficient 
 u  = CAR testing period (measured in days) 
 X i = Firm i dummy for u days surrounding lockup 
CAR = Cumulative Abnormal for 3 days surrounding lockup 
 
  
  
 The term Ri,t represents the return of firm i at time t, i representing the 279 data sample 
and t spanning the 88 days surrounding lockup, Rm,t is the return of the Standard & Poor’s 500 
index on day t, and Xi,u is the dummy variable for days u. The variable u, is the CAR testing 
period measured in days. For example, to test for the three day CAR, u would equal three. The 
88 day span includes 42 days before the lockup, the three day surrounding lockup, and the 44 
days post lockup. The coefficient γj represents of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the 
three days surrounding lockup. However, because γj is only representative of the dummy 
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variable, only of the return is reflected, as a result, γj is multiplied by u, testing to find the 
actual CAR.  
 
Calculation for CAR Significance using Z-Statistic 
 
 Using the same methodology as Meulbroek (1992), I used a z-statistic to test for whether 
the CAR is significantly different from zero.34 The z-statistic is equal to the sum of the t-statistics 
( ) for the dummy variable coefficient for the three days surrounding the lockup date divided by 
the square root of the total number of regressions. The Z-statistic calculated from the equation 
will provide me with statistical evidence of whether the CAR surrounding for CAR is in fact 
significant. 
 Therefore, by calculating the Z-statistic I will calculate whether the buyout backed IPOs 
CAR is statistically significant surrounding the time period. 
 
Calculation of Abnormal Volume 
 
 To calculate the abnormal trading volume, I used the same methodology as Field and 
Hanka (2001).35 The abnormal daily trading volume, , is the daily trading volume for firm i 
on day t. The abnormal volume is calculated by dividing the average volume surrounding the 
                                                             
34 Meulbroek, Lisa K. “An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading.” The Journal of Finance. 47.5 (1992): 
1674. Print. 
35 Field, Laura and Hanka, Gordon, 2001, “The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups,” Journal of Finance, 57, 478. 
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three day lockup by the average trading volume for the prior forty days ending six days before 
lockup.  
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return by Time Period 
 Table 4 represents the average cumulative abnormal return of the sample across a time 
series and each time span’s respective summary statistics. I also use a two-sided sign test of the 
null hypothesis that the median CAR for each time period is zero. The sign test value calculated 
is a p-value. For the three day period surrounding the lockup date, the sample’s CAR is negative 
.6 percent and is significantly negative (Z=-1.6061), the three day median is also shown to be 
negative .6 percent. Examining the individual CAR’s for the three day lockup period, all of the 
returns for each of the three days proves to be negative. The day prior to lockup is the most 
negative with a significant value of negative .5 percent (z=-1.52), the actual lockup date CAR is 
negative .2 (Z=-0.04), as well as the day after lockup with an average negative CAR of negative 
.3 percent (Z=-1.44). The return for the five days surrounding lockup is more negative than the 
three day return, with a significantly negative CAR of negative .8 percent  (Z=-2.41)  and a 
median of negative .7 percent. Both the 40 days prior and post lockup yield insignificant returns 
relatively. For the time period of 40 days prior to lockup ending on two days prior to lockup, the 
return is .08 percent (Z=1.0505). Starting on the second day after lockup, the CAR for the 40 
days post lockup yielded a CAR of 0.07 percent (Z=-.40).  
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Time Range Mean Median Z-Statistic of CAR Sign Test (Prob. Level) 
 
 
0.008515 
Day -41 to -2 (-0.2623) 0.00903 1.0505 0.0889 
         
-0.004765 
Day -1 (-0.02934) -0.00439 -1.5186 0.000153 
         
-0.001949 
Day 0 (-0.0383) -0.00053 0.0436 0.8692 
         
-0.002901 
Day +1 (-0.0357) -0.00095 -1.4442 0.3508 
         
-0.00674 
Day -5 to +1 (-0.0956) -0.00682 -1.2752 0.2491 
         
-0.005513 
Day -1 to +1 (-0.0591) -0.00578 -1.6061 0.4240 
         
-0.008096 
Day -2 to +2 (-0.0460) -0.00762 -2.4106 0.0547 
         
0.007556 
Day +2 to +41 (-0.2820) -0.00774 -0.3953 0.4756 
Table 5: CAR Descriptive Statistics 
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Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Sector 
 To better understand the effects of lockup agreements on buyout backed IPOs, the sample 
CAR is divided by business sector to explore the effects of lockup agreements by sector. Of the 
twelve sectors, eight had CAR values that were negative. The telecommunications, real estate, 
and high-technology sectors yielded significantly negative values. The high-technology sector 
has a CAR of negative 2.04 percent (Z=-2.06), while the telecommunications sector yielded a 
CAR of negative 3.3 percent (Z=-2.09). The real estate CAR on average is negative 3.1 percent 
(Z=-1.75), however, it should be noted that the real estate sector consisted of only three samples. 
The consumer products and services sector returned the lowest CAR with a value of .3 percent 
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Cumulative Abnormal 
Return  
(Standard Error) Min. Max. Median 
Z-Statistic of 
CAR 
Total 
N=279 
-0.00551 
(0.059045) -0.49786 0.220946 -0.00578 -1.6061 
Consumer Products & 
Services 
N=43 
0.0033502 
(0.046585) -0.12069 0.17908 0.003549 -0.3778 
Consumer Staples 
N=10 
-0.0134894 
(0.038492) -0.07575 0.049655 -0.01287 -1.2167 
Energy & Power 
N=26 
-0.0067186 
(0.038871) -0.08217 0.11183 -0.00988 -1.3439 
Financials 
N=29 
-0.0098343 
(0.03804) -0.08656 0.072449 -0.00685 -1.2915 
Healthcare 
N=21 
0.001046 
(0.057749) -0.16864 0.116531 0.002437 -0.5477 
High-Technology 
N=42 
-0.0203863 
(0.067965) -0.20609 0.161775 -0.00853 -2.06 
Industrials 
N=32 
0.0068836 
(0.044976) -0.06173 0.160811 0.004238 -0.3009 
Materials 
N=21 
-0.0066058 
(0.033651) -0.06634 0.057462 -0.0083 0.2767 
Media & Entertainment 
N=14 
-0.0059673 
(0.049271) -0.06553 0.083878 -0.0121 -0.9627 
Real estate 
N=3 
-0.0309345 
(0.03386) -0.06853 -0.00284 -0.02143 -1.7534 
Retail  
N=26 
0.0094493 
(0.052079) -0.08877 0.098154 0.008726 0.4481 
Telecommunications 
N=12 
-0.0336755 
(0.167386) -0.49786 0.220946 -0.01052 -2.0915 
Table 6 
 
Abnormal Trading Volume 
From the results, it is shown that there is a major increase in trading volume for the three 
days surrounding the lockup date. On average, there is a 24.24 percent increase in trading 
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volume for the three days surrounding the lockup period. This increase is substantially lower 
than the results of previous literature. Field and Hanka found an 80 percent increase in trading 
volume for the three days surrounding the lockup period (Field and Hanka 2001).  
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 To better understand the determinants of the CAR and abnormal volume surrounding the 
three day lockup period, I ran a multivariate regression each for the CAR and the abnormal 
volume. In addition to the surrounding three-day CAR and abnormal volume, other repressors 
included:  
   
   
Number of Lockups>1 = If the number of lockups exceeded 1 
Percent Locked Up = Percentage of Shares Locked Up 
Market Capitalization = Market Capitalization of Firm 
(measured in $thousands) 
Sector Dummy  → 12 Industry Sector Dummies 
Time Period Dummy  → 1990s & 2000s Dummies 
Index Dummy → NYSE & NASDAQ Dummies 
 
   
The regression results are displayed in Table 5 which includes the coefficients for each 
variable and their respective statistics. The regression for the surrounding three day CAR shows 
that the three day abnormal volume proves to be a significantly negative variable at the 99% 
confidence level. In addition, the dummy variables for the decades of the 1990s and 2000s prove 
to be statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. Inconsistent with Field and Hanka 
(2001), the results did not render the variable for the percent of shares locked up as a 
significantly negative variable. Another interesting statistic is that the NASDAQ dummy resulted 
in positively significant value while the NYSE dummy is significantly negative. This is 
intriguing because the NASDAQ index is composed primarily of high-technology companies, 
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which previous literature (Field and Hanka (2001) and Bradford et. al (2000)) has shown to be a 
significantly negative variable. I attribute this difference to the exclusion of venture-capital 
firms, and therefore, developing high-technology from my data set. The regression for the three 
day abnormal volume rendered different variables statistically significant. For example, the three 
day CAR was significant at the 99% confidence level. In addition, the sectors of financials, 
healthcare, high-technology, as well as media and entertainment proved to be statistically 
significant at the 90% confidence level.  
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 (1)   (2)  
 Dependent 
Variable: CAR 
  Dependent Variable: 
Abnormal Volume 
 
Independent Variables Coefficient     Coefficient   
Abnormal Volume -0.0092** 
(0.0245) 
    
CAR    -5.6462** 
(1.5039) 
 
Intercept -.1174 
(0.0789) 
  0.3853 
(1.9141) 
 
Number of Lockups >1 -0.0166 
(0.0151) 
  -0.4036 
(0.3747) 
 
Percent Locked Up -0.0153 
(0.0169) 
  0.4299 
(.4180) 
 
Market Capitalization 1.81x10-10 
(2.59x10-10) 
  4.35x10-9 
(6.41x10-9) 
 
Consumer Products & Services 0.0326 
(0.0356) 
  -1.019861 
(0.8800) 
 
Consumer Staples 0.0120 
(0.0394) 
  -1.5943 
(0.9709) 
 
Energy & Power 0.0149 
(0.0363) 
  -1.3312 
(0.8943) 
 
Financials 0.0121 
(0.0361) 
  -1.6541* 
(0.8892) 
 
Healthcare 0.0223 
(0.0370) 
  -1.5931* 
(0.9102) 
 
High-Technology 0.0020 
(0.0359) 
  -1.5062* 
(0.8830) 
 
Industrials 0.0316 
(0.0356) 
  -1.1912 
(0.8789) 
 
Materials 0.0163 
(0.0365) 
  -1.4540 
(0.9000) 
 
Media & Entertainment 0.0166 
(0.0377) 
  -1.6212* 
(0.9295) 
 
Retail 0.0360 
(0.0363) 
  -1.287668 
(0.8980) 
 
Telecommunications -0.0038 
(0.0384) 
  -0.3150 
(0.9506) 
 
1990-1999 Dummy 0.0994* 
(0.0597) 
  1.1535 
(1.4842) 
 
2000-2010 Dummy 0.1080* 
(0.0591) 
  0.6731 
(1.4721) 
 
Days Locked Up=180 Dummy -0.0112 
(0.0196) 
  0.0341 
(0.4860) 
 
Days Locked Up>180 Dummy -0.0129 
(0.0267) 
  -0.1584 
(0.6622) 
 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.0033 
(0.0363) 
  0.2303 
(0.8996) 
 
NYSE Dummy -0.0031 
(0.0361) 
  0.0654 
(0.8950) 
 
      
Observations 279   279  
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0462   0.0691  
Notes: Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and Abnormal Volume are measured over three days surrounding 
lockup expiration.  *=Significant at 90% Level, **=Significant at 99% Level 
Table 7: CAR and Abnormal Volume Regression Results 
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VII. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of lockup agreements on buyout 
backed IPOs. Unlike previous literature which examined the effect of lockup agreements on the 
entire IPO population, my data sample consisted solely of buyout backed IPOs. The data sample 
consisted of 279 companies spanning the time period of 1990 to 2010. 
Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that buyout backed IPOs suffer a less negative 
CAR for the three-day period compared to prior literatures findings. I also find a significantly 
negative return of negative .6 percent CAR for the three-day period surrounding the lockup 
expiration date (Z=-1.61). This contrasts the significantly negative 1.5 percent CAR found by 
Field and Hanka (2001). This result is consistent with my hypothesis that the CAR for buyout 
backed firms would be less than for a sample containing venture-capital backed companies or the 
general IPO population. Field and Hanka found a negative 1.5 percent CAR overall and a 
negative 2.3 percent CAR for venture-capital backed companies.36 Economists such as Bradley 
and Jordan (2000) have discovered the skewing effects of including venture-capital companies in 
their sample. They find the “abnormal returns in the period surrounding lockup expiration are 
mostly due to the 45 percent of the firms in our sample with venture capital backing […] such 
firms lose, on average, three to four percent of their value in this period.”37  
                                                             
36 Field, Laura C., and Gordon Hanka. "The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups." Journal of Finance 56.2 (April 
2001): 471-500. Print  
37 Bradley, Daniel, Bradford Jordan, and Ivan Roten. 2001, "Venture Capital and IPO Lockup Expiration: An 
Empirical Analysis." 24. Print. 
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The start of the 21st century proved to be a very eventful time for b industry. In an 
industry where the cost of debt is a critical component of the business strategy, the ease of 
lending standards coupled with inexpensive credit enabled the private equity industry to perform 
an enormous buying binge. When the market collapsed, it forced private equity firms to postpone 
many of their investment’s IPOs, and therefore, postpone the benefits of their investment. With 
the majority of lockup agreements now lasting at least six months, these private equity firms will 
be forced to wait even longer to liquidate their investment. Although lockup agreements help 
support stock price, it seems interesting that a private equity firm, who is typically the majority 
shareholder, does not better structure the lockup agreement so they could better be able to 
liquidate their investment in economic downturns such as today. From what I have investigated 
through SEC S-1 documentation, private equity firms never insert clauses enabling them to 
liquidate if need be. Because lockup agreements are not required by law, it would seem 
beneficial for private equity firms to structure the agreements in this manner. 
As Brav and Gompers (2003) notes, “because the parameters of the lockup are well 
specified (in terms of length and number of shares locked) and known at the time of the IPO, if 
markets perfectly anticipated the release there should not be an abnormal price reaction at the 
time of the expiration.”38 However, economists consistently find a negative abnormal stock 
return for the period surrounding lockup expiration. Abiding by the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH), a firm’s stock price should be reflective of all available and relevant information.39 If 
                                                             
38 Brav, Alan, and Paul A. Gompers. "The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings." The Review of Financial 
Studies 16.1 (Spring 2003): 2. Print. 
39 "Market Efficiency Definition." Investopedia.com. Web. 24 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketefficiency.asp>. 
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this is the case, there should be no abnormal price reaction surrounding the lockup expiration. 
This creates future avenues for research of lockup agreements and their relation to the EMH. 
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